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trial court sentenced each defendant to a term of one to fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison and ordered each to pay a fine of 
$10,000. It then stayed the sentence and fine and placed defend-
ants on eighteen months1 probation (R. 5-6 (Withers record), 127-28). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At t r i a l , the prosecution presented the fo l lowing r e l e -
vant evidence. On April 6 , 1984, Bruce Aust in, the caretaker of 
Vivian Armstrong's house on Harvard Avenue in S a l t Lake City 
while she was away in Arizona, was a t that house and not iced 
nothing out of the ordinary (R. 144, 148-49, 1 5 3 ) . In the early 
morning hours of April. 7, Austin received word that a burglar 
alarm at the Armstrong home had been a c t i v a t e d . When he arrived 
there a t approximately 4:20 a.m., several po l i ce o f f i c e r s were on 
the scene and had discovered a broken window on the east s ide of 
the house. Austin and the o f f i c e r s observed two s e t s of f o o t -
pr in t s in the sof t s o i l d i r e c t l y below the broken window, blood 
s t a i n s on the curta ins that were hanging in the window, a broken 
g l a s s t a b l e top j u s t i n s i d e , and muddy foo tpr in t s leading from 
the window t o a s l i d i n g g l a s s door which was ajar (R. 155-61, 
197, 210 -11 ) . To Austin, one s e t of f oo tpr in t s appeared t o have 
been made by a "pointed! , ] western-type boot ," and the other by a 
•running shoe or a tennis - type shoe" (R. 162) . The f o o t p r i n t s ins ide 
the house appeared to be from one type of shoe, but not a running or 
t enn i s shoe (R. 1 8 5 - 8 6 ) . Austin a l s o r e c a l l e d that the yard and 
garden around the house had been watered the night before (R. 167) . 
A po l i ce o f f i c er who arrived a t the Armstrong home at 
approximately 4:03 a.m. in response t o the burglar alarm noticed 
- 2 -
a car with a loud exhaust and at l e a s t two persons in the front 
seat drive slowly by the house. The driver looked in the 
o f f i c e r ' s d i r e c t i o n , then acce lerated the car and turned i t north 
onto a c r o s s - s t r e e t and disappeared. Although he could only 
ident i fy the driver as being male, the o f f i cer n o t i f i e d dispatch 
of the susp ic ious v e h i c l e , describing i t as a black over yel low 
General Motors make with a red door (R. 193-95, 198-200) . 
Shortly after rece iv ing information about the 
suspic ious v e h i c l e , another o f f i cer in the area of the burglary 
spotted a car that matched the descr ipt ion given him. The 
o f f i cer followed the car, l o s t i t for f i f t e e n t o twenty seconds, 
and then observed i t parked, with i t s headl ights off , on the s ide 
of the s t r e e t . Once a backup o f f i c er had arrived, the two of 
them approached the parked car. Each noted that the engine hood 
was s l i g h t l y warm and that one person was ly ing on the front seat 
and another covered with a blanket on the back sea t . When the 
o f f i c e r s knocked on the c a r ' s window, defendant E l l i s ex i ted the 
car from the front seat and defendant Withers from the back seat . 
Defendants appeared to have been drinking, but both seemed 
coherent. Withers, who wore tennis shoes and whose pants were 
wet up t o the knee, i d e n t i f i e d himself as Marty Wolfe. He 
claimed that he had been in the back seat of the car parked a t 
that l o c a t i o n since midnight of that evening and that he did not 
know how his pants had become wet. He explained that he, E l l i s , 
and another person had been driving around and drinking during 
the evening, and that he had passed out around midnight thinking 
he was in West Va l l ey . E l l i s , who wore leather boots and whose 
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pants were wet and muddy at the bottom, claimed that he had been 
hitchhiking and that the car had been parked a t i t s present 
l o c a t i o n for ten t o f i f t e e n minutes. When asked about what 
appeared to be a jagged and bloody cut of perhaps one inch on h i s 
l e f t hand,2 E l l i s responded that there was nothing wrong with h i s 
hand. After being informed that the o f f i c e r s were i n v e s t i g a t i n g 
a burglary and that defendants1 car matched the descr ip t ion of a 
car observed in connection with the crime, E l l i s responded, 
"Well, i t wasn't t h i s one because we j u s t got here ." However, 
without having r e c e i v ^ any ind ica t ion of the l o c a t i o n of the 
burglary, E l l i s , in denying that defendants were involved in the 
crime, appeared t o nod h i s head in the d i r e c t i o n of the Armstrong 
res idence . F ina l l y , expert testimony at t r i a l e s tab l i shed that 
the blood s t a i n on the curtain a t the crime scene contained the 
same type of blood as E l l i s ' s (type A, a common blood type) (R. 
248-60, 320-37, 356-64, 374-97) . 
Defendant Withers called one witness at trial, his 
father. He testified that, at his house in West Valley City, on 
the evening of April 6, he observed his son in a drunken state 
with a friend. He stated that his son had a drinking problem and 
had in the past turned himself into a "detox" center under the 
name of Marty Wolf. Defendant used the name Wolf to avoid police 
detection for outstanding criminal warrants. However, Mr. 
Withers did not know the whereabouts of his son at around 4:00 
a.m. on April 7 (R« 427-34). 
2
 The police officer who testified about the apparent cut could 
not say whether it was old or new; however, he stated that some 
fresh blood appeared to be on the wound (R. 343-44). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Because defendants f a i l t o show t h a t t h e r e was a 
poten t ia l or ac tual v io l a t ion of the ru le of Bruton v. United 
Stal&S, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the only ground upon which they 
challenge the t r i a l c o u r t ' s refusal to sever the i r cases for 
t r i a l , t h i s Court should uphold the lower c o u r t ' s denial of 
defendants ' severance motion. 
Under Utah R. Evid. 701, and t h i s Cour t ' s appl ica t ion 
of former Utah R. Evid. 56(1), the t r i a l court properly admitted 
testimony of a lay witness regarding foo tp r in t s a t the scene of 
the crime. Because tha t w i tne s s ' s testimony was r a t iona l ly based 
on h i s perceptions a t the crime scene and was helpful to the 
determination of a fac t in i s sue , the t r i a l c o u r t ' s evidentiary 
rul ing did not cons t i tu t e an abuse of d i sc re t ion . 
This Court has cons is tent ly held tha t a "reasonable 
a l t e r n a t i v e hypothesis" in s t ruc t ion need not be given t o the 
ju ry , even in a case based solely upon circumstant ia l evidence, 
when complete in s t ruc t ions on reasonable doubt and the S t a t e ' s 
burden of proof are given. Suff ic ient i n s t ruc t ions having been 
given in defendants' case, there i s no merit to t h e i r argument on 
the reasonable a l t e r n a t i v e hypothesis i s sue . 
Although admittedly not overwhelming, the evidence 
presented a t t r i a l was suf f ic ien t to support the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t s . 
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ARGUMENT 
PQINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANTS1 REQUEST 
FOR SEVERANCE OF THEIR TRIALS. 
Prior to t r i a l , defendants moved to have their t r i a l s 
severed. The sole basis for their jo int motion was an 
anticipated v io lat ion of their right of confrontation under 
ar t i c l e I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the sixth and 
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. 
Defendants rel ied exclusively on the holding of Bruton v. United 
States . 391 U.S. 123 (1968), in advancing the argument that they 
would be denied the constitutional right of confrontation i f 
their t r i a l s were not severed and the prosecution were allowed to 
present evidence of their inconsistent out-of-court statements to 
the police off icers regarding the length of time their car had 
been parked at the location of their arrests for the instant 
burglary (R. 473-82). Observing that, unlike Bruton, defendants1 
case did not involve a clearly incriminating extrajudicial 
statement of a codefendant, the tr ia l court denied defendants1 
request for severance (R. 4 82). 
In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the defendant's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses 
against him was violated when an incriminating confession of a 
codefendant, who did not take the stand at t r i a l , was admitted 
into evidence. The Court stated: 
We hold that, because of the substantial risk 
that the jury, despite instructions to the 
contrary, looked to the incriminating extra-judicial statements of [codefendant] Evans1Is] 
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confess ion in t h i s j o i n t t r i a l v io la ted 
p e t i t i o n e e s right of cross-examination 
secured by the Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment. 
391 U.S. at 126. Clear ly , the Court was most troubled by the 
very real p o s s i b i l i t y that the jury would re ly on "powerfully 
incriminating ex tra jud ic ia l statements of a codefendant, who 
stands accused s ide -by - s ide with the defendant," in f inding the 
defendant g u i l t y . I d . at 135-36. In determining whether there 
has been or could be a v i o l a t i o n of the Bruton ru le , the courts 
are general ly qui te demanding, i n s i s t i n g that the "challenged 
statements must be c l e a r l y inculpatory." Nelson v. F o l l e t t e , 430 
F.2d 1055, 1057 (2d Cir . 1970) , s s x t . .denied, 401 U.S. 917 
(1971). Accordingly, prnfron i s frequently deemed inappl icable i f 
the statement contains only "linkage evidence," that i s , 
information which, standing alone, does not incriminate the other 
defendant but which tends t o l ink him to the crime when i t i s 
considered together with other evidence admitted at t r i a l . 
United Sta tes v . Wilkerson. 754 F.2d 1427, 1435 (2d Cir . 1985) , 
££JLl^ deniedP U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 3482 ("defendant's Bruton 
r ight s would be v i o l a t e d , however, only i f the statement, 
standing alone, would c l e a r l y inculpate him without introduct ion 
of further independent evidence") , United S ta tes v. Wrightf 742 
F.2d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir . 1984) (no BmtQH v i o l a t i o n where 
confess ion not "powerfully incriminating," i . e . , would not 
incriminate "without reference t o other, admissible evidence"); 
United S ta te s v . B e l l e f 593 F.2d 487, 494 (3d Cir . 1979) , jcfcJLt. 
denied. 442 U.S. 911 ("evidentiary l inkage or contextual 
impl icat ion may not be u t i l i z e d t o convert a non-Bruton 
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admiss ible statement i n t o a Bruton inadmissible s tatement") , 
fillt £££ &£ll£r 593 F.2d a t 501-11 (Gibson, J . , d i s sent ing) 
(arguing that where "the prosecut ion ' s evidence against one 
part icular defendant was wholly c ircumstantial in nature" and 
"the only s o l i d evidence in one l ink in that c ircumstantial chain 
cons i s ted of an e x t r a j u d i c i a l statement of a codefendant," then 
Bruton should apply)• 
Given t h i s general ly accepted view that Bruton does not 
apply in s i t u a t i o n s where the e x t r a j u d i c i a l statement of a co-
defendant f standing a lone , i s not c l e a r l y incriminating, a view 
t h i s Court appears t o have adopted, JSL££ S ta te v. P ierre f 572 P.2d 
1338, 1351-52 (Utah 1977) £ £ i £ . den ied , 439 U.S. 882 (1978) 
(rul ing that there was no Bruton v i o l a t i o n ) , the t r i a l court in 
the ins tant case correc t ly concluded that the ant ic ipated 
introduct ion of defendants' incons i s t en t statements t o the po l i ce 
concerning the length of time the i r car had been parked a t the 
l o c a t i o n of the ir a r r e s t s would not v i o l a t e Bruton. Those 
statements , although admittedly detrimental to defendants when 
considered together as a circumstance which was perhaps 
i n d i c a t i v e of g u i l t , hardly could be characterized as c l e a r l y 
incriminating when taken i n d i v i d u a l l y . They would not c l e a r l y 
inculpate one defendant or the other insofar as the charged 
offense was concerned. £££ P ierre , 572 P.2d a t 1351-52. 
Therefore, the t r i a l court correc t ly rejected defendant's pruton 
argument and, that being the only b a s i s for the severance motion, 
properly refused t o sever defendants for t r i a l . In short , 
joinder of defendants for t r i a l did not c o n s t i t u t e an abuse of 
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d i s c r e t i o n or deny e i ther defendant a f a i r t r i a l . JS££ State v. Peter-
son, 681 P.2d 1210, 1214 (Utah 1984) ( t r i a l court ' s dec i s ion to allow 
joinder of defendants w i l l not be disturbed absent showing of c lear 
abuse of d i s c r e t i o n ) ; State v. C o l l i n s . 612 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 1980) 
(denial of a motion for severance of defendants w i l l be reversed only 
i f a defendant's right t o a fa i r t r i a l has been impaired); Utah R. 
Crim. P. 9(b)&(d) (UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-35-9(b)&(d) (1982) ) . 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT ALLOWED A LAY WITNESS TO TESTIFY ABOUT 
HIS OBSERVATIONS OF FOOTPRINTS AT THE CRIME SCENE. 
As noted in t h i s b r i e f ' s statement of f a c t s , Bruce Austin, a 
caretaker of the burglarized house who arrived at the scene of the 
crime shortly after it had occurred, testified at trial about his 
observations of footprints outside the house in the soft ground 
directly below the broken window and muddy footprints on the floor 
inside. The following exchanges concerning that testimony took place 
at trial during the prosecutor1 s direct examination of Austin: 
[PROSECUTOR]: You described earlier a 
little decorative stand that was by the 
window. What was the condition of that? 
[AUSTIN]: That was lay ing [ s i c ] on the 
f loor which i s shown in the one picture there 
underneath the — or s l i g h t l y behind the drape. 
Q. Did you look on the ground on the outs ide 
beneath the window on the morning of the 7th? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What, if anything, did you observe? 
A. Footprints in the soft soil underneath 
the window. 
Q. Could you determine by looking at 
them how many sets of footprints? 
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MS* MOWER: Your Honor, I'm going to 
object at this point without further 
foundation, and I believe it's asking for an 
opinion by a lay person he's not qualified to 
make. 
MR, HARWARD: I'm just asking him yes or 
no, could you determine how many sets. 
THE COURT: I'll allow him to answer 
that question. 
Q. (BY MR. HARWARD): Could you 
determine how many sets? 
A. Yes, two— 
MS. MDPfER: Objection, Your Honor. 
Volunteering. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection as 
to the response other than the yes answer. 
I'll allow that to stand. 
MR. HAEWARD: So the yes answer may 
stand? 
THE COURT: Right. You may proceed with 
your next question, counsel. 
Q. (BY MR. HARWARD): Now, did you 
determine—I'm not asking how many sets you 
saw, but how did you make a determination as 
to how many sets of footprints there were? 
A. From the size and shape of the 
print. 
Q. Did you see different distinctive 
prints in the ground? 
A. Yes. From my observation it 
appeared that there was [sic] two. 
MS. MOWER: Your Honor, I'm going to ask 
that that answer be stricken. 
THE COURT: I would ascertain that it's 
not responsive, and I would sustain the 
objection. 
You may proceed with the next question, 
counsel. 
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Q. (BY MR. HARWARD): Describe what you 
observed in relation to the configuration of 
the footprints as you saw it. What did you 
observe? 
A. Two sets of footprints in the soft 
soil. 
Q. Describe what you saw to enable you 
to make that determination. 
A. Two different shapes of footprints. 
Q. Are you able now t o t e l l the jury 
the d i f f erent shapes as you observed them? 
A. One appeared to be a pointed 
Western-typ^ boot, and the other one appeared 
to be, l i k e , a running shoe or a tennis - type 
shoe. 
(R. 160-62 ) . On cross-examination, defendant Withers 1s counsel 
e l i c i t e d the fol lowing testimony from Austin: 
Q. (BY MS. MAXFIELD): So by the time 
you arrived on the scene, there had been a 
number of po l ice o f f i c e r s who had been near 
the area of the broken window; i s that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Besides muddy footprints on the 
carpet and the footprints that were outside 
of the window, there was another muddy 
footprint on the window itself, was there 
not? 
A. On the sill, yes. 
Q. But that wasnft included in any of 
these exhibits; is that right? 
A. No, because all it was was just mud. 
Q. Okay. When you were present, did 
you see anybody take any footprints of that 
window area? 
A. Take footprints? 
Q. I'm sorry. Fingerprints. I'm 
getting my hands and feet mixed up. 
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A. Nor I d idn ' t observe that . 
Q. Okay. Now, you said that outs ide 
there were two d i s t i n c t shapes of p r i n t s ; i s 
that r ight? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On the ins ide there was only one 
d i s t i n c t shape of pr int ; i s n ' t that r ight? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And i s i t correct t o say that there 
would have been a d i s t i n c t heel on the print 
that was ins ide the house? 
A. I fcon't know as you'd say i t was 
d i s t i n c t . I t was — the two were d i s t i n c t -
i ve ly d i f f e r e n t from each other i s what I 
meant. 
Q. And the print on the ins ide d idn' t 
look l i k e a t enn i s shoe, did i t ? 
A. No. 
Q. And i t d idn' t look l i k e a running 
shoe? 
A. No. 
Q. Le t ' s s ee . What e x h i b i t s are we 
ta lk ing about? I guess i t ' s e x h i b i t 6 and 
5,3 and those are — l e t me have you look a t 
those again. I s that the shape that you 
thought looked kind of l i k e a running shoe? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Or t enn i s shoe? 
A. Or waff le pattern, design bottom, 
whatever. 
Q. Some kind of rubber bottom shoe, 
r ight? 
3 Exhibi ts 5 and 6 were po l i ce photographs of the f o o t p r i n t s 
Austin observed. Those e x h i b i t s were admitted i n t o evidence 
without object ion from defendants (R. 164-66)• 
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A. Right. 
Q. And you can' t t e l l even from that 
print what brand of shoe; i s that r ight? 
A. Oh, no. 
(R. 184 -86 ) . During redirect examination of Austin, the 
fol lowing exchanges were had: 
[PROSECUTOR]: Concerning the photo-
graphs of these footprints, I'll show you 
exhibit 4 and exhibit 5. Do either one of 
those appear to be like the print you saw on 
the inside? 
MS. WOW^ R: Your Honor, I'm going t o 
object t o h i s character izat ion or h i s opinion 
at t h i s point in t ime. Again, I don't think 
we have s u f f i c i e n t foundation t o e s t a b l i s h 
that h e ' s able to make that judgment. 
MR. HAEWARD: I t ' s red irec t on a 
quest ion Ms. Maxfield asked. 
MS. MAXFIELD: Your Honor, I asked the 
quest ion — 
KR. HARWARD: Ms. Maxfield ~ 
THE COURT: One a t a time, Counsel. 
MS. MAXFIELD: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Now, you may respond or go 
ahead. You may s t a t e your object ion . 
MS. MAXFIELD: If my quest ion was not 
understood, I think i t was understood by the 
w i tnes s . My quest ion was only as t o the 
t enni s shoe pr int , and I simply asked whether 
that would have been the same print that he 
saw on the ins ide by shape. I d idn' t ask any 
quest ions about any other pr int . 
MR. HARWARD: But the l i n e of 
quest ioning opens up for me t o ask on 
red irec t , did e i ther one of these appear to 
be l i k e the one he t e s t i f i e d as being 
out s ide . 
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THE COURT: I w i l l overrule the 
objec t ion and allow him to t e s t i f y what he 
observed there and what he f e l t he saw. 
MR. HARVARD: Does the quest ion need t o 
be read back? 
THE COURT: I don't know. 
THE WITNESS: That's f i n e . Yes, the one 
p ic ture here with the d i s t i n c t i v e heel 
marking appeared to be the one on the i n s i d e 
on the carpet . 
Q. (BY MR. HARWARD): For the record, 
can you t e l l us the number of the e x h i b i t . 
A. S t a t e ' s e x h i b i t no. 4 would be the 
one that woaid be, in ray opinion, the one 
that marked the carpet on the ins ide of the 
house. 
Q. Thank you. 
MS. MOWER: Your Honor, I would move t o 
s t r i k e that l a s t b i t of test imony, h i s 
opinion about the one being the same. Again, 
i t requires expert opinion t o i d e n t i f y 
f o o t p r i n t s . We have no foundation here. I 
guess I don't have any problem i f he says , 
they looked kind of the same, or, we have to 
exclude the running shoe and we can' t exclude 
t h i s other shoe. But we have absolute ly no 
foundation that would back h i s opinion at 
t h i s point . 
THE COURT: The court would overrule the 
objec t ion and allow the answer to stand. I 
think i t ' s proper. 
(R. 1 8 7 - 8 9 ) . F i n a l l y , in a combined motion in l imine and motion 
to s t r i k e , defendant E l l i s ' s counsel argued that the court should 
s t r i k e that portion of Aus t in ' s testimony concerning the 
s i m i l a r i t y of the f o o t p r i n t s ins ide and outs ide of the house (R. 
268 -70 ) . The fo l lowing dialogue between the court and counsel 
appears in the record immediately after the combined motion was 
made: 
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THE COURT: Let roe ind icate to you that 
the way I ruled — and I'm s t i l l inc l ined t o 
rule the same way — i s that a wi tness — and 
I w i l l admit that your witness did say, after 
he gave h i s answer that he sa id , in my 
opinion, which I don't think was necessary 
for him to add t o i t . But a person can 
t e s t i f y as t o what he saw and what he 
observed and where he saw one footprint 
outs ide and another footpr int i n s i d e . And he 
can t e s t i f y that he observed they appeared t o 
him to be s imi lar . That's h i s observat ion. 
That i s not the testimony of an expert . That 
i s the testimony of an eyewitness as t o what 
he observed. 
And that i f they have other wi tnesses 
who were there and saw the foo tpr in t s outs ide 
and the foo tpr in t s ins ide and observed most 
of those f o o t p r i n t s , they can t e s t i f y that t o 
them they appeared t o be s imi lar . 
But I am agreeing with you that as far 
as them coming in and saying — 
MS. MOWER: They are the same. 
THE COURT: — They are the same 
foo tpr in t , no, they cannot. They can t e s t i f y 
as to what they observed. And I can ' t 
remember the exact quest ion , but I b e l i e v e 
t h a t ' s the way the quest ion was posed t o the 
w i tnes s . He did say, in my opinion. 
MS. MOWER: But he said they were the 
same. 
THE COURT: I can ' t remember h i s exact 
answer. 
MS. MOWER: That's my r e c o l l e c t i o n . 
THE COURT: Well, we don't need to go 
back. I ' l l be glad t o ind ica te — I was 
going to say we can review the testimony, but 
I don't think i t ' s necessary. I ' l l be glad t o 
ind icate t o the jury j u s t exact ly what I 've 
to ld you, that they can observe, but that i s 
not a d e f i n i t e ind ica t ion that they are the 
same. And any person who observed i t can 
t e s t i f y t o i t . And I'd allow others t o , and, 
of course, I w i l l admonish the jury on t h a t . 
And, of course, you can argue that t o the 
jury, too . 
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MS. MOWER: Well , t h a t ' s f i n e f i f the 
court would i n s t r u c t . I mean, i f you would 
remember to ins truct them as t o that tomorrow 
or i f the i s sue comes up again, I j u s t 
thought i t would be helpful to have Mr. 
Baldwin come in for the future use of the 
footprint i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and j u s t have him 
say that regular people can ' t ident i fy t h i s 
s tu f f , you know. 
THE COURT: Of course, I don't want t o 
control your case for you, counsel . But I 
would, even i f he came in and t e s t i f i e d t h a t , 
I would s t i l l allow an eyewitness to t e s t i f y 
as to what he observed and as t o what he saw. 
MS. MOWER: So be the c o u r t ' s ru l ing , 
but i f we could have the i n s t r u c t i o n . 
THE COURT: If you could prove t o me I'm 
wrong on tha t , i f you've got cases — 
MS. MOWER: I ' l l look for some. 
THE COURT: Fine. I ' l l admit that an 
expert i s the one that g ive s the opinion 
testimony and that where he makes some study 
i n t o i t . But a layperson can look at two 
th ings , t h i s one and t h i s one and say they 
appear to be the same, and he can t e s t i f y as 
to what he saw. He saw a footpr int that 
looked l i k e i t was made by gym shoes. He saw 
another footpr int ins ide that looked l i k e i t 
was made by gym shoes. 
MS. MOWER: I guess the real object ion 
i s relevance t o the lay test imony, then. I 
don't know. I understand the c o u r t ' s ru l ing . 
If we could j u s t have the i n s t r u c t i o n 
tomorrow, I 'd be happy. 
THE COURT: I ' l l be glad t o , and I think 
i t ' s proper because he did say opinion. And 
I don't know exact ly how i t was phrased. 
(R. 270-73) . 
On appeal, defendants argue that the t r i a l court 
improperly allowed Austin to give opinion testimony regarding the 
s i m i l a r i t y between the f o o t p r i n t s he observed ins ide and outs ide 
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the burglarized house, and t o make comparisons of those 
foo tpr in t s based upon the po l i ce photographs of them. As an 
i n i t i a l matter, upon reviewing the transcr ipt excerpts s e t forth 
above, there appears to be some quest ion as to whether defendants 
interposed adequate object ions t o a l l of the testimony they 
chal lenge on appeal, Jj££ Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (Supp* 1985); 
State v. Bagley. 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984) . However, 
beyond the waiver problems defendants face , the ir contention that 
Aust in ' s testimony should have been excluded as inadmissible lay 
opinion testimony under Utah R. Evid. 701 (Supp. 1985) i s without 
meri t . 
Rule 7014 provides: 
If the witness is not testifying as an 
expert, his testimony in the form of opinions 
or inferences is limited to those opinions 
or inferences which are (a) rationally based 
on the perception of the witness and (b) 
helpful to a clear understanding of his 
testimony or the determination of a fact 
in issue. 
Although this Court apparently has never construed Rule 701, it 
did have occasion to construe the nearly identical language of 
former Utah R. Evid. 56(1) (1977). As noted by defendants, this 
Court in Arnovitz v. Tellaf 27 Utah 2d 261, 495 P.2d 310 (1972), 
discussed the meaning of that rule: 
. . . It is generally recognized that 
opinions or conclusions of ordinary witnesses 
derived from common experience and observa-
tion of things which persons generally are 
capable of comprehending and understanding 
are admissible in evidence when the nature 
4
 Rule 701 is the federal rule, verbatim. Committee Note to Rule 
701. 
-17-
of the subject-matter i s such that i t cannot 
be reproduced or d e t a i l e d to the jury pre-
c i s e l y as i t appeared t o the wi tness a t the 
time, or where i t i s not pract icable to lay 
before the jury the primary or const i tuent 
f a c t s , so that they can draw the proper 
inferences and form an i n t e l l i g e n t judgment. 
• • • 
27 Utah 2d a t 263, 495 P.2d at 311 (quoting In Re M i l l e r ' s 
£stait£r 36 Utah 228, 102 P. 996 (1909)) . £££ JLLSQ Roods v. 
Eofids, 645 P.2d 640, 642 (Utah 1982) ( t r i a l c o u r t ' s admission of 
mother's testimony on the subject of g e s t a t i o n was not error 
under former Utah R. Evid. 5 6 ( 1 ) ) . As i s evident from the above 
excerpts of Aust in 1 s testimony on d irec t examination, he merely 
described the shapes of the two s e t s of f o o t p r i n t s he had 
observed in the s o i l beneath the broken window. This was in 
addi t ion t o h i s e a r l i e r testimony that he had observed muddy 
f o o t p r i n t s leading from the window to a s l i d i n g g la s s door which 
was ajar (R. 1 5 9 ) . Not unt i l Withers1 s counsel asked, on c r o s s -
examination, d e t a i l e d quest ions about the f o o t p r i n t s ins ide and 
outside of the house did Austin begin t o make any s i g n i f i c a n t 
comparisons between them or to refer to the po l i ce photographs of 
them. Not surpr i s ing ly , t h i s testimony came in without object ion 
from e i ther defendant. The prosecutor's subsequent ques t ions on 
redirect examination of Austin that referred t o the po l i ce 
photographs were nothing more than a permissible cont inuat ion of 
in terrogat ion in an area opened up by defendant Withers 's 
counsel . Given t h i s Court's app l i ca t ion of Rule 701 ' s 
predecessor, Rule 5 6 ( 1 ) , in Arnovitz and &o&dS, the t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
ru l ing in the ins tant case that Austin could t e s t i f y about the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the f o o t p r i n t s he observed ins ide and outs ide 
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the house, and note any s i m i l a r i t i e s he perceived between them, 
should not be disturbed on appeal. £££ s t a t e v. Royball , 710 
P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1985) ("iTlhe t r i a l c o u r t ' s rul ing on the 
a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence w i l l not be reversed absent a showing 
that the t r i a l court so abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n as t o create a 
l i k e l i h o o d that i n j u s t i c e r e s u l t e d . " ) ; accord State v. Gray. 717 
P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986) . Any opinions or inferences 
regarding the foo tpr in t s that were part of Aust in ' s testimony 
were "rat ional ly based on the perception of the witness" and 
"helpful t o a c lear understanding of h i s testimony or the 
determination of a fact in i s s u e . " Rule 701 . Discerning 
s i m i l a r i t i e s between d i f f erent s e t s of f o o t p r i n t s , based upon 
personal observation of the f o o t p r i n t s , i s not beyond the realm 
of an average person's experience; and therefore admission of a 
lay w i t n e s s ' s opinion on that matter would be proper under Rule 
701. State v. Walker, 319 N.W.2d 414, 417-18 (Minn. 1982) ( in 
burglary and t h e f t prosecution, no error in admitting lay opinion 
of sher i f f deputy that the boots of defendant and his brother 
made the foo tpr in t s observed and photographed by deputy at crime 
scene, given l i b e r a l i t y of Rule 701) . That po l i ce photographs of 
the foo tpr in t s were introduced at t r i a l should be of l i t t l e 
consequence. According t o a s t a t e expert w i tness , those 
photographs were not par t i cu lar ly helpful (R. 400-09) . 
This conclusion i s cons i s t ent with the view that , under 
Rule 701 and the modern trend in the courts , "the opinion rule 
today i s not a rule against opinions but a rule condi t iona l ly 
favoring them." McCormick, M., "Opinion Evidence in Iowa," 19 
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Drake L. Rev. 245, 274 (1970) . &>&, fi^, United S ta te s v. 
BALk&I, 735 F.2d 1280, 1283-84 (11th Cir . 1984) , £fiUt. A&ni&d, 
U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 329 ( in a prosecution for 
misappl icat ion and conversion of t r a v e l e r ' s checks, opinion of 
two lay wi tnesses and co-workers of defendant that they were 
fami l iar with defendant's handwriting and that the handwriting on 
checks matched or was s imilar t o defendant's was admiss ible under 
Rules 701 and 9 0 1 ( b ) ( 2 ) ) ; Young v, I l l i n o i s Central Gulf R. R> 
£o^r 618 F.2d 332, 337 (5th Cir. 1980) (in ac t ion t o recover for 
wrongful death of dec£c!ent when struck by t ra in a t rai lroad 
cross ing which widow claimed was caused in part by condit ion of 
cros s ing , error t o have excluded testimony of lay wi tnesses about 
t h e i r observations of cross ing and t h e i r impressions of i t s 
general cond i t ion ) ; State v. No HeartP 353 N.W.2d 43, 48 (S.D. 
1984) (court affirmed defendant's robbery convic t ions and held 
that po l i ce o f f i c e r ' s opinion that v i c t i m ' s i n j u r i e s were not 
caused by f i s t but were caused by something sharper was properly 
admitted; court s tated that d i s t i n c t i o n between wound caused by 
f i s t and wound caused by a sharper object i s not beyond the realm 
of an average person's experience, c i t i n g S.D.C.L. § 1 9 - 1 5 - 1 ) . 
£ £ . K le inberger v . A l l e n Products C o . . I n c . . 581 F.Supp. 9 4 1 , 942 
(E.D. Pa. 1984) ( in ac t ion brought under copyright laws a l l eg ing 
that defendant copied p l a i n t i f f ' s cookie jar , court struck 
testimony of p l a i n t i f f ' s lay wi tness to extent that i t amounted 
t o opinion that cookie jar was copied; court s tated that opinion 
was not based upon any knowledge of the mechanics of ceramics 
manufacturing techniques s u f f i c i e n t upon which to base the 
conclusion or opinion reached regarding the copying of the j a r ) . 
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Based upon the foregoing d i scuss ion , defendants1 
chal lenges to Aust in ' s testimony should be rejected as m e r i t l e s s . 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANTS1 REQUESTED REASONABLE 
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS INSTRUCTION. 
Defendants argue that the t r i a l court erred in not 
g iv ing the ir requested "reasonable a l t e r n a t i v e hypothesis" 
ins truc t ion in a case that was based e n t i r e l y on circumstantial 
evidence. j£j££ Defendants1 Requested Ins truct ion No. 1 (R. 58 ) . 
This argument, howeveiv ignores t h i s Court's holding in State v. 
Larocco. 665 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1983), that such an ins t ruc t ion i s 
not necessary i f the t r i a l court g ives i n s t r u c t i o n s that f u l l y 
explain t o the jury the reasonable doubt standard and the S t a t e ' s 
burden of proof in a criminal case . Furthermore, "Iain 
in s t ruc t ion on reasonable a l t e r n a t i v e hypothesis i s not required, 
even when the evidence i s s o l e l y c ircumstant ia l . w Larocco, 665 
P.2d at 1273 (footnote omitted) . Because the t r i a l court in 
defendants' case gave complete reasonable doubt and burden of 
proof ins truc t ions (Instruct ion Nos. 3 , 6; R. 75 , 77) , no error 
occurred when i t refused t o give defendants' requested 
i n s t r u c t i o n . This i s cons i s t en t with numerous of the Court's 
recent rul ings on t h i s i s s u e . £fi£ State v. Hansen, 710 P.2d 182, 
183 (Utah 1985); State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681, 683 (Utah 1985); 
State V, McClflin, 706 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah 1985) . 
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POINT IV 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT 
TRIAL TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICTS. 
Defendants argue that the State presented insufficient 
evidence at trial to support their convictions. When considering 
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court has 
applied the following standard of review: 
This Court will not lightly overturn the 
findings of a jury. We must view the 
evidence properly presented at trial in the 
light most favorable to the juryfs verdict, 
and will only interfere when the evidence 
is so lacking and insubstantial that a 
reasonable man could not possibly have 
reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. 
We also view in a light most favorable to 
the juryfs verdict those facts which can be 
reasonably inferred from evidence presented 
to it. 
State v, McCardellP 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982) (citations 
omitted). As noted in State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985): 
In reviewing the conviction, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the 
jury. "It is the exclusive function of 
the jury to weigh the evidence and to 
determine the credibility of the witnesses. 
. . . " State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 
231 (1980); &S&QL£ State v. Lindenr Utah, 
657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1983). So long as 
there is some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, from which findings of all the 
requisite elements of the crime can reasonably 
be made, our inquiry stops. 
Id. at 345 (citation omitted). And, even if the Court views the 
evidence as less than wholly conclusive, or if contradictory 
evidence or conflicting inferences exist, the verdict should be 
upheld. State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). In short, 
"on conflicting evidence the Court is obliged to accept the 
version of the facts which supports the verdict." State v. 
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Isaacson, 704 P.2d 555, 556 (Utah 1985) , s i t i n g State V. Howell* 
649 P.2d at 93. F ina l ly , c ircumstantial evidence alone may be 
competent t o e s t a b l i s h the g u i l t of the accused, s t a t e v. 
Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1982) . 
Defendants were charged with burglary under the theory 
that they, "as par t i e s t o the of fense , entered or remained in the 
dwell ing of Vivian Armstrong with the intent t o commit a theft" 
(jS££ Information (R. 1 2 ) ) . The evidence that the prosecution 
presented a t t r i a l in support of that charge i s summarized in 
t h i s b r i e f ' s s tatement of f a c t s . The State must concede that the 
evidence did not overwhelmingly e s t a b l i s h defendants1 g u i l t ; 
however, i t appears that i t was l e g a l l y , even i f marginally, 
s u f f i c i e n t t o support the i r convic t ions of burglary. £ f . jJJtaJLe 
v. Isaacson. The jury could have reasonably concluded that 
defendants were present a t the Armstrong house, broke one of i t s 
windows, and unlawfully entered i t (the testimony concerning 
foo tpr in t s s u f f i c i e n t l y es tab l i shed that a t l e a s t one person was 
i n s i d e ) , from the fol lowing circumstances: (1) a broken window 
and an open s l i d i n g g l a s s door at the Armstrong house; (2) 
defendants were found by p o l i c e a short d is tance away from the 
burglary, immediately after i t had occurred, in a parked car that 
had been observed driving slowly past the Armstrong house by the 
f i r s t po l i ce o f f i cer to arr ive in response to the burglar alarm; 
(3) defendant Withers gave p o l i c e a f a l s e name when asked to 
ident i fy himself; (4) the bottoms of defendants1 pants were wet 
and/or muddy ( th i s coupled with information that the yard and 
garden around the Armstrong house had been watered short ly before 
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the burglary occurred); (5) defendant Withers was wearing tennis 
shoes and defendant Ellis leather boots at the time of their 
arrest; (6) the two sets of footprints under the broken window at 
the Armstrong house appeared to have been made by a tennis or 
running shoe and a western-type boot;5 (7) muddy footprints led 
from the broken window to the sliding glass door that was ajar; 
(8) Ellis appeared to have a cut on his hand; and (9) the blood 
stain on the curtain in the broken window contained the same type 
of blood as Ellis's. 
As for the ihtent to commit a theft, the jury could 
have validly inferred that intent from the unlawful breaking and 
entering of a dwelling during the night. It is well settled that 
intent "may be inferred from the actions of the defendant or from 
the surrounding circumstances." State v. MurphyF 674 P.2d 1220, 
1223 (Utah 1983). In a burglary case, although the act of 
entering a building alone does not give rise to an inference that 
the actor entered with the requisite intent to constitute 
burglary, "the authorities uniformly agree that where one breaks 
and enters the dwelling of another in the nighttime, without the 
latter1s consent, an inference may be drawn that he did so to 
commit larceny." State v. Brooksf 631 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1981). 
£££ AISQ State v> Sisneros, 631 p.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1981). 
Indeed, the jury in defendants1 case was instructed on this 
permissible inference (SSLS. Instruction No. 20 (R. 91)), and most 
5 in addition to photographs of the footprints, the jury had 
before it the footwear defendants were wearing at the time they 
were arrested (Exhibit 16-S, R. 260-61; Exhibits 17-S and 18-S, 
R. 412). 
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probably re l i ed upon i t in reaching g u i l t y v e r d i c t s . Defendants 
do not dispute that the evidence e s tab l i shed that the break-in at 
Armstrong's house occurred during the night . 
Therefore f the t r i a l court properly denied defendants' 
motion t o arres t judgment which argued that i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence 
to support the ir convic t ions required that r e l i e f . 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon foregoing arguments, defendants' convic t ions 
should be affirmed. /*—-»-** 
RESPECTFULL$\submitted t h i s <*/ day of June, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
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